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  Abstract	  
Are we as a society (global, national or local) incomplete if we do not adhere to the 
substantial truths to be gained by alignment with the western democratic notion of the rule of 
law? Is the notion of the rule designed with the built in paradox that the rule of law will itself 
become the basis for future designs of society, defining where we are, where we want to be 
and even in time, possibly (re)defining where we have come from? In raising questions and 
challenging current and historical discourse on the notion of the rule of law, this thesis seeks 
to theoretically identify tensions and contradictions in our existence through a blind 
acceptance of the power of the rule of law. Law making and legal reform indicates where 
(socio-politically) a society wants to be but the application of those laws and the resulting 
case law indicates where we are (actual) as result of where we have come from – related to 
the resilience within the legal system to change. This thesis examines the way the Swedish 
legal system (the courts) have applied the sexual crimes law(s) and recent case law. Are these 
indicators of legal justice but social injustice? Despite these new laws, it appears that the legal 
system cannot guarantee the rights of children as securely as the system can guarantee the 
rights of those accused of violating children’s rights.  
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Introduction	  
 
“I have to begin with qualification. I am not a lawyer/…/”1 
This is a thesis about social justice and legal (in)justice. In a previous undergraduate project 
paper (2012) that has preceded and inspired this thesis2 I partook in an evaluation which 
focused on and analysed the application of the then recently implemented law reforms 
governing sexual offences against children3. Certain verdicts reached by the Swedish Supreme 
Court were established in case law where sexual offenders who had engaged in sexual activity 
with children under the legal age of consent (15) were not tried for rape, as was required by the 
law (SFS 2005:90) and was also stated in the legislative history relating to the law. Instead, 
these men were convicted of the “lesser” crime of sexual abuse of a minor, a crime that carries 
a lesser penalty. It was concluded in that evaluation that the courts seemed reluctant in 
exercising the law to the full extent of what was required in the legislative history, where 
factors such as age of consent, coercion and free will were included in how the courts 
interpreted the law in some cases before passing judgment. It was also concluded in that paper 
that although seeming unequivocally clear in the legislative history that certain requisites could 
not be admitted as mitigating circumstances as part of the defence for a sexual offender who 
had engaged in sexual activity with a child, the Swedish courts seemed to “find” motivation to 
include such factors and thus “limit” the actual and intended effect of the law in guaranteeing 
justice for the victim.  
What is of importance in this thesis is that such verdicts were actually reached in the Swedish 
legal system and that the newly implemented law reforms did not achieve their potential as was 
outlined in the legislation. This was due to the application and interpretation of those laws in 
and by the Swedish courts, working strictly under the principles of the rule of law. This thesis 
is a theoretical attempt to understand the dogma of the legal system and the actual verdict in the 
case studied as indicators of “the temporal condition of law” (my terminology), where I attempt 
relate the dogmatic adherence of the courts in how they uphold the principles of the rule of law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Giddens, Anthony, Risk and Responsibility, The Modern Law Review, Vol.62 Jan. 1999, No. 1 
2 Fransson, Therése, Wedin, Niklas, Woodlock, John (2012). Samtyckets vara eller icke vara i tillämpningen av 
sexualbrottslagstiftningen 
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8 
as a signature of an inheritance of legal thinking within the paradigm of legal modernity. In this 
thesis I wish to offer a deeper and more challenging theoretical approach as to why the courts’ 
seem unwilling or unable to exact social change by fully embracing legislative change and law 
reform, thus seeming incapable of securing emancipatory justice for the most vulnerable in 
society – our children. Indeed as Paul Ricouer has suggested:  
“A still more redoubtable problem is when the choice is not between the good and the bad but between the bad 
and the worst. Our laws governing/…/the question of children, stem from this alternative, which we can say is 
truly tragic. There are many moral and judicial decisions where the stake is not to promote the good but to avoid 
the bad.”4 
The overarching themes in this thesis are those of space, time, narrative and justice where the 
historical “juridical discourses”5 that occur in the various juridical spaces of the “paradigm of 
(legal) modernity”6 may be undergoing a “period of paradigmatic transition”.7 When 
reflectively and critically approached from a predominantly theoretical perspective, the 
paradigm of legal modernity may indeed demonstrate some transitional tendencies, congruent 
with and confirming of the critical socio-legal theories of de Sousa Santos and Hydén8 and the 
sociology of Bauman. 
At the same time the method of ethical inquiry employed here in this thesis also attempts to 
reveal if deeply rooted underlying artefacts of historicity and tradition (such as strict adherence 
to the governing principles of the rule of law in substantive legal justice) continue to establish 
implicit meanings in legislation, affectations that are designed to maintain dominance. Such 
discourses seem to ensure that the ‘dynamic’ of transition never causes ‘ascending vibrations’9 
and as such, cannot challenge what I refer to here in this thesis as “a parallel continuum of 
strategic stagnancy” (my terminology). What is meant here is the discursive stagnancy of legal 
dogma and the parallel paradigmatic approach of legal and social sciences. This stagnancy, 
which I equate with de Sousa Santos’s notion of “historical inertia”10discursively resides in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 SFS 2005:90 
4 Ricoeur, Paul, The Just, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1995 (2000 ed.), p. 243 
5 ibid, p. 119  
6 Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, Towards a New Legal Common Sense, (2nd Ed.) Butterworths, London, 2002, p. 4 
7 ibid, p. 4 
8 Fransson, Therése, Wedin, Niklas, Woodlock, John (2012). 
9 Santos, 2002, p. xv 
10 Santos, 2002, p.xv 
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9 
general ‘space’ of the legal modern paradigm, and seems to be preventative of alternative 
notions of justice from establishing other ‘emergent realities’.11  
“The pluralistic character of social conflicts make the application of universal moral principles and revitalization 
of narrative traditions a question of dynamic interpretation, where new situations without preceding cases 
challenge given legal standards and demand imaginative and original solutions at the limits of traditional 
understanding of law”12  
By applying the Rawlsian method of reflective equilibrium together with a critical discourse 
analysis to specifically chosen texts from the legislative history, it is my contention that it may 
be possible to achieve a sense of coherence and equilibrium between considered judgements 
surrounding the legal justice administered in the case and expectations of social justice relating 
to the law reform. This equilibrium is not only related to the actuality of the legal justice in the 
explicit narrative presented but also provides a potential for understanding underlying inherited 
structures that may or may not surround the passing of judgment in the Swedish courts, an 
implicit parallel narrative in the texts. 
In short, by combining the narrative and critical discourse analysis with the critical theory of 
Paul Ricoeur and the socio-legal theory of de Sousa Santos, I propose to use the verdict reached 
in the case to serve as an indicator of the temporal condition of law in crisis, both deficient and 
excessive all at once. This relates to the legal modern paradigm proposed by de Sousa Santos 
and juridical discursive spaces in time proposed by Ricoeur. In trying to achieve coherence 
between the law reform and the verdict in question, by deconstructing meaning from aspects of 
the legislative history using critical discourse analysis it may also be possible to uncover what 
is implicitly incoherent between the intended purpose and scope of the law and the courts 
interpretation and application of the law in relation to the rule of law and assumptions of 
justice. Reflecting back and forth over the verdict and the legal narrative that surrounds the 
verdict involves three temporal perspectives, the past (prior to the verdict), the then present 
(2006 when the verdict was delivered) and the then future (the present now - 2013). Borrowing 
certain aspects from Ricoeur’s theories of “the temporality of action”13 and “interpretation and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 ibid, p. xv 
12 Schmidt, Lars-Henrik (ed.), Paul Ricoeur, In The Conflict of Interpretations, Aarhus Universitetsforlag, Århus, 
1996, p.122  
13 I refer here to the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy for the best shortened explanation of Paul Ricoeur’s 
Theories 
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discourse theory” and de Sousa Santos notions of “periodic paradigmatic transition” and  
“crisis of modern law” from his theory of “oppositional postmodernity”14 allows me to 
experiment with the hypothesis that such a verdict is both legally predictable and socially 
predictable as unjust if one considers all discursive spaces that complete the whole of legal 
modernity and the practice of the rule of law. I have presented this thesis by including all parts 
in the model of a theoretical narrative because “Narrative theory is a better model of the way 
discourse, action and interpretation are connected”15 
I will theoretically approach the legislative history, the law text, the actual verdict, the courts’ 
application of the law and the subsequent case law as integral parts in an on-going juridico-
political narrative where juridical discourse occurs in all such spaces. This narrative may also 
be perceived as an integral part in a larger temporal narrative, the paradigm of legal modernity 
which I will examine in section two of this thesis.  Firstly I will describe and establish the legal 
narrative in the “background”, then explain the key concepts, describe the purpose of the thesis 
and present my research questions. I will then explain my methodological approach and briefly 
discuss the validity and reliability of my research and applied method. I will then analytically 
and theoretically deconstruct aspects of the legislative history to apply and reflect over the legal 
narrative to examine any deficiencies and/or excesses explicit and implicit in the legal text and 
understandable under the paradigm of legal modernity. I will then attempt to relate my findings 
to the manner in which the courts and judges applied the actual law and upheld the rule of law 
through a continuum of stagnancy.  Finally I will discuss if the right to a fair trial is ‘just’ only 
for the offender and to the structure (legal system) but unfair and unjust to the victim by 
examining if the rights of the offender have become the wrongs of the victim”. As Paul Ricoeur 
has also stated; 
   “The cry of injustice is the cry of the victim”16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Santos,  2002,  p.12 
15 Kaplan, David M. ”Ricoeur’s Critical Theory” State University of New York Press, New York, 2003, p.54 16	  Ricœur, The Just, 2000, p.54 
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Background	  
It is not my intention in this thesis to once again analyse how and why the courts reached such 
decisions as mentioned above. I am confident that it would be possible to empirically expand 
on that under graduate paper, but I have no wish to do so in this thesis. Rather I wish to 
construct a narrative based on chronological events that surround the law reform17 and the 
application of that law.  
 
Freeman (2000) suggests that an undeniable factor that differentiates child sexual abuse from 
other forms of abuse is that the victims are mostly female and that men are usually the 
perpetrators of such offences.18 Is this where the narrative is pre-figured or configured, a universal 
truth that surrounds the violence of men?  Alvesson and Sköldberg suggest that /…/every narrative 
moves through the fundamental medium of time”19 where they further suggest that knowledge 
needs to be restored with ‘a lost awareness of time”. 
The Narrative Begins? 
It is a foundational responsibility for society to protect all children and adults against all forms 
of sexual abuse and violations of the sexual integrity20. The criminalization of sexual offences 
is congruent with the aims of all other criminalized offences – to prevent the occurrence of such 
crimes.21 Concerning the regulation of sexual offences, the right to sexual self-determination 
and sexual integrity are those interests that are of paramount importance to protect and 
guarantee.22 The regulation governing sexual offences ought to be clearer. In 1998 a 
government appointed commission in reference to the then existing regulation of sexual 
offences recommended that the legal focus should shift from the type of sexual act involved to 
focusing on the sexual violation and the nature of that violation. This committee were tasked 
with finding a solution which would remove the inclusion of force and coercion in legal 
procedure by allowing the legal term (pre-requisite) ”rape” to extend and cover all forms of 
serious sexual abuses of children (my italics). The application of force and coercion in legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 SFS 2005:90 18	  Freeman, Michael D. A. (red.), Overcoming child abuse: a window on a world problem, Ashgate, Aldershot, 
2000, p.6	  19	  Alvesson, Mats & Sköldberg, Kaj, Reflexive methodology: new vistas for qualitative research, SAGE, London, 
2000 p. 92-93	  
20 Prop. 2004/05:45, p. 19 (my translation) 
21 2004/05:JuU16, p.10 (my translation) 
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cases has been regarded as leading to ‘unreasonable’ verdicts in cases of sexual abuse of 
children (my italics).23   
”In crime the polarity between power and powerlessness reaches its highest level” 24 
The 2005 reform of Chapter 6 of the Swedish Penal Code had strategically aimed at 
emphasizing and strengthening the protection of children and youth against exposure to 
violations of their sexual integrity25 where the governments’ ambitions were to reduce 
unnecessary ambiguity by formulating clear and precise regulation where the language of the 
law was to be modernized by removing outdated legal terminology.26 Often integrated into the 
wording of legislative history is that the content and meaning of certain (pre)requisites “are left 
to legal application” to determine which also leaves the courts (judges) with the roll of deciding 
how to limit and apply the necessary pre-requisites and the legislation/law.27  
Following the recommendations of an appointed law commission in the state public inquiry 
(SOU 2001:14), the then sitting Swedish government introduced a Government Bill (Prop. 
2004/05:45) and implemented reforms28 to The Swedish Penal Code on Sexual Offences, 
Section 6. These changes to the Penal Code were implemented in 2005. The reformed law text 
in Chapter 6. 4§ read as follows: 
“A person who has sexual intercourse with a child under fifteen years of age or who with such a child carries out a 
sexual act that with paid consideration to the type of violation and the circumstances is comparable to sexual 
intercourse, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for rape of a child for a minimum of two and maximum of six 
years”.29 
 
 
In 2006 a legal case involving sexual offences against a minor and governed by the above 
mentioned reformed Penal Code, the Swedish Supreme Court (the highest legal instance in 
Sweden) did not find a twenty three year old man guilty of the rape of a fourteen year old girl 
on these premises;  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 SOU 2001:14, p.13 (my translation) 
23 SOU 2001:14, p.13 (my translation) 
24 Santos, 2002, p.394 
25 Prop. 2004/05:45, p. 21 (my translation) 
26 Prop. 2004/05:45, p. 21 (my translation) 
27 Zetterström, Stefan, Juridiken och dess arbetssätt – en introduktion, Justus Förlag, 2008, p.90 
28 SFS 2005:90 
29 Br.B 6 kap.4§ (my transl.) 
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”In these decisions the Supreme Court refers to the legislative history and points out that the factual circumstances 
that are accentuated in this relates to premises to judge an action as sexual exploitation of children is the  plaintiffs 
age and that the sexual act from their side was free willing. The Supreme Court further cites that the child’s free 
will must be judged with consideration to the child’s maturity and ability to see the consequences of their 
actions.”30 
Referring to established law, the Swedish Supreme Court cited a similar case, B-3998-05. In 
that case the defendant was twenty five and the plaintiff thirteen. The court ruled that the 
defendant was not to be convicted of rape of a child31 but of the lesser serious crime of sexual 
exploitation (abuse) of a child32 using mutual consent as a mitigating factor in the defence of an 
accused.  
In the legislative history however relating to the reformed law it also clearly stated that; 
“Children under 15 years of age can never consent to sexual acts with the effect of releasing an offender from full 
accountability”33    
The Rule of Law and The Act of Judging – What or Who? 
 
/…/the rule of law is obviously closely related to liberty.”34  
The rule of law ( Sv. rättssäkerhet) in regards to criminal cases is defined in a report 
commissioned by the Swedish Office of the Chancellor of Justice as being; 
  
“/…/that legal security for individuals that a good and predictable legal system provides and whose paramount 
guarantee is that no one be convicted for crimes if guilt cannot proven beyond a reasonable doubt”35.  
 
Legal rights/legal certainty  (Sv. rättstrygghet) is also defined as being; 
 
 “/…/the security/certainty that is grounded in society taking responsibility to avoid and prevent the exploitation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 NJA 2006 s.510 
31 Br.B 6 kap.4§ (my transl.) 
32 Br.B 6 kap.5§ (my transl.) 
33 Prop. 2004/05,  p.156 
34 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1999, p. 
35 ”Rättsäkerheten i Brottmål, Rapport från JK:s andra rättsäkerhetsprojekt”, 2009:18 (my translation) 
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people to criminal offences and – if criminal offences occur – ensuring all reasonable actions are taken to hold 
those guilty of crimes accountable before the law”36 
 
The rule of law and legal certainty may in some respects oppose each other where guaranteeing 
the principles of the rule of law can at the same time reduce legal certainty, and a good standard 
of legal certainty risks compromising the rule of law.37 The rule of law is strengthened if a 
judge strictly maintains the requisite of evidence in criminal legal cases, but often at the 
expense of a weakened legal certainty.38 Objections are regularly raised, mainly by lawyers, to 
the application of and possible changes to the existing regulations for rape. These objections 
suggest that the security of the accused under the rule of law is threatened because the burden 
of proof is too low.39  
It must be recognized that in legal decision making many factors and variables are intrinsically 
involved in a process that extends beyond the actual legal regulation.40 Legal criteria for 
decision making (judgments) may be undermined by other stronger interests, where legal 
interpretation is overridden to the advantage of those interests.41 Every time a system interest is 
challenged by individuals the tendency is that the legal system and courts interpret in the 
direction of the systems interests.42 Legislation is primarily directed towards the authorities and 
institutions, not to individuals43 where legal systems traditionally are dominated by a judge 
based perspective44, that is to say, a top-down perspective where established law is solidified 
and clarified in specific areas.45 “Judges, we can say, give flesh to justice. They are the 
mouthpiece of justice”.46 
Douzinas and Warrington, discussing legal interpretation argue that legal statements are both 
statements and actions in that they involve interpretation of the law and also action on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Ibid., p.18 (my translation) 
37 Ibid., p. 63 (my translation) 
38  Ibid., p. 63 (my translation) 
39 Lejonhufvud, Madeleine, Samtyckesutredningen – lagskydd för den sexuella integriteten, Thomson Förlag, 
Stockholm, 2008, p.82 
40 Hydén, Håkan, Rättsociologi som Rättsvetenskap, Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2002 (2006 ed.) p.22 
41 Ibid., p.23 
42 Ibid., p.21 
43 Ibid. p.199 
44 Ibid., p.80 
45 Ibid., p.98 
46 Ricœur, Paul, Reflections on the just, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007, p.226 
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world.47 Suggesting that over the years jurisprudence, having turned to hermeneutics, semiotics 
and literary theory, has centred a focus on the word “judge”, where Douzinas and Warrington 
argue that the force of that word is neglected. They further suggest that the meaning-seeking 
and meaning-imposing aspects of judging are often analyzed from a political perspective that 
assumes reason, discretion, predictability, contingency and open-endedness amongst other 
things.48 Paul Ricoeur, suggests that “/the act of judging…expresses the force of the law; what 
is more, it states the law in terms of a singular situation”.49 Ricoeur discusses how in legal 
argumentation and interpretation, variations on meaning are produced. Discussing two Kantian 
notions of judgements, determinative judging which involves relating a singular case to a legal 
rule, that is to say, when knowledge of the rule is greater than knowledge of the case and 
reflective judging  which involves a greater knowledge of the case and a seeking of a rule. 
Ricoeur relates this mixture to the notion of application. This is understandable from the idea 
that; “/…/it is necessary to interpret the law in order to decide which one the case falls under. 
But it is also necessary to interpret the case, principally through the narrative, in order to be 
able to give a ruling regarding the fit between the description of the case and the angle from 
which the law is interpreted”50  
Purpose,	  Research	  Questions	  and	  Key	  Concepts	  	  
Purpose 
The main purpose of this thesis is to attempt to theoretically and (in part) philosophically 
explore the administration of justice in and by a formal legal institution (The Swedish Legal 
System) governed by and adhering to the rule of law, when applying a newly reformed law. 
By abstracting an actual legal verdict (that I contend in this thesis serves as an indicator of the 
deficiencies and excesses of the legal modern paradigm) that has been adjudicated over in the 
Swedish Supreme Court into co-existing alternative juridical spaces within the general space of 
juridical discourse, (that is to say a space that includes legal philosophy, socio-legal theory, and 
abstract spaces such as the Theory of Justice developed by John Rawls) I aim to study the 
effect of this verdict  (based on Rawlsian and Ricoeurian theories) to see if legal justice served 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Freeman, M.D.A. Lloyds Introduction to Jurisprudence, (Eighth Ed.), London, 2008,  p.1473 
48 ibid.,  p.1474 49	  Ricœur, The Just,  2000, p.129	  
50 Ricœur, Reflections on the just, 2007, p.218-219 
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for the greater good of society serves also as a form of social injustice for some. By applying 
the Rawlsian method of reflective equilibrium (which in this thesis is both a methodological 
approach and a theoretical pillar), together with critical discourse analysis, I aim to demonstrate 
how the socio-political will for emancipation is denied reaching full potential for the greater 
good of society by a legal dogmatic regulative stagnancy maintained in and by the courts, 
where the sense of justice served is to maintain that system. 
Working from a socio-legal perspective and by theoretically exploring the potential of reuniting 
actual formal legal justice with societal expectations of emancipatory social justice (by 
expanding the boundaries of the general space of juridical discourse) this thesis attempts to 
develop a theoretical framework that allows for such a reunification to take place. My work is 
based on these three research question: 
1. Can formal legal justice also serve as emancipatory social justice if the greater good of 
society is potentially maintained through the continued dogmatic adherence to the 
principles of the rule of law? Moreover, do the courts administer justice with the 
primary intention of upholding those principles, where a formal concept of “justice” is 
served for “the greater good of society”?  
2. If Western democratic societies are undergoing “a crisis of law” as a characteristic 
signature of the paradigm of legal modernity, do socio-political expectations of law and 
emancipatory justice extend beyond the temporal and actual capacity of the courts in 
embracing and exacting social change through law?   
3. Has social justice for some become the sacrificial lamb that just institutions occupying 
the discursive space of legal modernity are willing to offer in order to maintain a sense 
of equilibrium between the apparent stagnancy of legal dogma and the rule of law and 
the progressive dynamic of the societies that are governed by those principles?  
Key Concepts 
Time	  and	  Narrative	  
The concepts of time and narrative will be explained together throughout this thesis as these 
concepts make up the fabric of the theory. In that the theories of Paul Ricoeur are central it is 
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his definition that I employ here, his conception of historical time that unites two more 
elementary senses of time, “lived time” and “cosmic time”.  
Time	  
The concept of time in this thesis relates to Ricoeurs notion of the temporality of action where I 
also relate de Sousa Santos period of paradigmatic transition to Ricoeurs notion of cosmic time.   
 “There is cosmic time, the time of the world that unfolds as a sequence of uniform, qualitatively undifferentiated 
moments in which all change occurs, but in which any present is defined simply in relation to what comes before 
and after; these times come before this “now”, those after. 51 
Narrative	  
The narrative is a manifestation of the creative capacity for language and is a central theme for 
Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy.52 Based on the historicity and temporal experiences of human 
action, Ricoeur’s concept of the narrative is related to the role he assigns narratives as 
articulating the intelligibility of prefigured human actions. For Ricoeur, it is the discourse of the 
narrative that configures human actions53, where he also argues that all human relationships 
cannot avoid discourse”54  
“To give expression to this complex historical present one must use a kind of discourse that can articulate both 
strings of actions and events and their human contexts. The kinds of discourse that can do that is narrative” 55  
In this thesis, by reflectively establishing the narrative historicity of the law reforms and the 
verdict in the then present (2005-2006) is may also prove possible to understand the structures 
behind the discourses that have articulated that narrative in the past. Moreover, this discursive 
temporality of action may still maintain a stagnancy in the present. These aspects are of central 
interest in this thesis.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Dauenhauer, Bernard and Pellauer, David, "Paul Ricoeur", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/ricoeur/>. 
52 Kaplan, p.47 
53 ibid., p.47 
54 Ricoeur, The Just, p. 240 
55 Dauenhauer, Bernard and Pellauer, David, "Paul Ricoeur", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/ricoeur/>. 
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Juridical	  Discourse	  
 “/…/ what is discursively possible in a given historical situation?” 56 Paul Ricoeur discusses 
how in a variety of domains (which I refer to as ‘spaces’ in this thesis) juridical discourse takes 
place. In the judicial instance which involves trials, tribunals, judges and courts, juridical 
discourse occurs and dominates. Institutions which articulate and implement legislation and 
laws, jurisprudence and critical legal theory and legal philosophy are also such spaces where 
the juridical discourse takes place. I include sociology of law as a space where this 
paradigmatic discourse presides. Ricoeur goes further, and by referring to Perelman, also 
suggests that public opinion, laws that result from legislative bodies, and judicial decisions 
(verdicts in this thesis) are also ‘submitted’ to juridical discourse. I would argue, from a 
sociology of law perspective, that Ricoeur extends juridical discourse outside the confines of 
law, the juridical and hegemonies of legal thinking and seems congruent with Hydén and 
Mathiesens contention that law is not above society but an integral part of society.57 
“Discourse refers back to its speaker at the same time that it refers to the world./…/Discourse in action and in use 
refers backwards and forwards, to a speaker and a world”58  
Reflective	  Equilibrium	  
John Rawls discusses reflective equilibrium and the method of reflective equilibrium in his 
book a “Theory of Justice” (§§4,9). Rawls argues that our conception of justice is not only 
related to our own actual situation but that our idea of justice may also be deeply affected by 
tradition and our contemporary expectations.59 To understand how these inheritances and 
existing intuitions form our considered judgments related to justice, we must work back and 
forth with these considered judgements, revising them or even adding to them until we achieve 
some acceptable level of coherence between them. “The key idea underlying this view of 
justification is that we “test” various parts of our system of beliefs against other beliefs we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Ricoeur, The Just,  p.119 
57 See Fransson, Therése, Wedin, Niklas, Woodlock, John (2012). This was a key point of departure in the 
evaluation that preceded this thesis. 
58 Ricoeur, Paul, Interpretation Theory:Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning, The Texas Christian University 
Press, Fort Worth, 1976 (Seventh ed.), p.22 
59 Lovett, Frank, Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 2011, p.37 
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hold, looking for ways in which some of these beliefs support others, seeking coherence 
amongst the widest set of beliefs/…/”.60  
Justice	  
The concepts of justice that are central to this thesis are based on the theories of justice developed by by 
John Rawls and the critical theory of Paul Ricoeur. I do not go further into their concepts of justice as 
fairness and capability justice other than to use their notion of justice to provide this thesis with a 
foundational base that is independent of the justice administered in formal legal systems. 
 “Being first virtues of human activities, truth and justice are uncompromising"61 
 “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought”.62   
John Rawls’s assertions are for this thesis underlying general maxims that intersect with and 
partially govern all other theoretical aspects I attempt to develop and elaborate on here. Rawls 
claims that his theory of justice generalizes and is superior to existing theories of justice in that 
it lifts the notion of the social contract “to a higher level of abstraction”63 where he further suggest 
that a conception of justice can be more desirable to others if the scope of consequences are more 
agreeable64. John Rawls’s theory of justice is concerned with the basic structure of society, where the 
citations given above describe the role of justice in society. Rawls suggests that the primary subject of 
justice is the basic structure of a society65.   Paul Ricoeur argues that our “modern” sense of justice 
(related to resurgence of vengeance) is part of a long historical process of overcoming our quest 
for vengeance, where vengeance has been “rooted in” and exacted through violence.66  Ricoeur 
discusses how the Rawlsian notion of justice establishes two key points of departure, the binary 
relationship of justice and social institutions but also the disjunction between truth and justice67 
where the Rawlsian conception of justice “/…/is both holistic and distributive”.68 Justice is only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Daniels, Norman, "Reflective Equilibrium", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/reflective-
equilibrium/ p. 2 
61 Rawls, A Theory of Justice,  p.4 
62 ibid., p.3 
63 ibid., p.3 
64 ibid., p.7 
65 ibid., p.47 
66 Ricoeur, Reflections on the Just, p.231 
67 ibid., p.59 
68 Ricoeur, The Just ,  p.45 
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part of an “all-inclusive vision” of a good and well-ordered society and cannot serve as 
anything more than a part of that conception.69  
Paradigmatic	  transition	  
This is a theoretical concept proposed by Boaventura de Sousa Santos to describe what he 
suggests is a postmodern temporal transition from late modernity, a period that has 
emancipatory potential that seems limited by the failed promises and inheritances of the 
paradigm of modernity. 70  De Sousa Santos notion of the paradigmatic transition involves a 
postmodern conception of law, where he has attributed a role which presupposes a process of  
‘unthinking’ hegemonic and dogmatic conceptions of modern law. De Sousa Santos discusses 
how in the period of paradigmatic transition “deficits and excesses” have given rise to a 
sociocultural condition that is characterized by the collapse of emancipation into 
regulation.71Periods of paradigmatic transition are ambiguous which de Sousa Santos suggests 
is observable in modern law. 
Problems and limitations 
 
In researching and writing this thesis, this section deals with the most difficult and challenging 
aspect of this process. I have had enormous difficulty in trying to limit the scope of what ought 
be included and/or excluded in this thesis but also in deciding how this thesis ought be 
structured and formed. In that this is a theoretical thesis, my reliance on empirical data is 
limited and serves only as an indicator of the strategic structure of legal stagnancy and the 
discourse of maintaining the continuum of that narrative. It became necessary to limit the scope 
of my theoretical approach to include primarily the theories of de Sousa Santos and Ricoeur, 
and to limit the theoretical influence of John Rawls theory of justice that I also wished to 
include. Initially I considered including a gender perspective, a different and more detailed 
empirical approach and a broader legal perspective, directly relating to Swedish law and 
international commitments to the protection of children as being the foundational approaches to 
this thesis. However I felt that to do so, and perhaps this may be the next possibility following 
this theory, was to ignore the effect that the initial academic inquiry I was part of had on my 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Rawls, John. ”John Rawls, Collected Papers” Harvard University Press, Cambridge, London, 1999,  p.48 
70 Santos, p.12 
71 ibid., p.12 
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own sense of justice. I felt that to understand how and if justice had been served for the greater 
good of society, this thesis would have to include moral and ethical aspects, as well as 
challenge the structures that surround those perspectives. This is why I have chosen the critical 
thinking of Paul Ricoeur. 
I am aware that certain other academic and socio-legal perspectives would enhance and 
challenge this thesis, but I view this work as an initial stage of an ongoing process. I hope that 
having addressed the issues contested in this thesis that this paper can serve as a template to 
allow for a potential to explore and include such perspectives subsequent to the understanding 
gained in this thesis.  I have strategically limited this thesis to the study of a single verdict. I 
only wish this verdict to serve the purpose of indicating the condition of law in relation to the 
space of Swedish law and also to the space-time of the paradigm of legal modern thinking. In 
my concluding comments I will offer my reasoning for this. In spite of limiting my application 
of Rawlsian theory, I have however applied Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium, but only 
as a method of ethical inquiry. I have at the same time attempted to approach this inquiry with 
narrative theory and discourse analysis in harmony with the method of reflective equilibrium.  
Methodological	  Approach	  	  
General 
This thesis adopts a theoretical approach which relies heavily on the theories of Paul Ricoeur 
and Boaventura de Sousa Santos where I have also employed a theoretical abstract method that 
serves as the overarching approach in developing a theory in this thesis,  John Rawls’s “method 
of reflective equilibrium”. I have employed this method as an overarching approach throughout 
my work on this thesis with the primary aim of theoretically demonstrating the condition of law 
in the modern paradigm of legal thinking. I have already explained this method in the Key 
Concepts of this thesis, offering here an explanation which explains the difference between 
wide and narrow reflective equilibrium. Rawls differentiates between “narrow” and “wide” 
reflective equilibrium. Narrow reflective equilibrium is reached (by an individual) involving 
few revisions to initial judgments concerning a concept of justice and by ignoring alternative 
conceptions of justice, making other judgments “fit” with an unrevised judgment. Wide 	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reflective equilibrium is reached when a person is willing to revise initial judgements having 
reflected over alternative conceptions of justice and the valid arguments for those alternatives. 
Wide reflective equilibrium appeals to reasonableness and coherence that continues after 
reflection.72 Rawls suggest that the judgments reached in reflective equilibrium are more 
reliable than previous considered judgments where he argues that for his concept of ‘justice as 
fairness’, the sense of justice must match the judgements reached in reflective equilibrium.73 
“Viewed most generally, a reflective equilibrium is the end-point of a deliberative process in 
which we reflect and revise our beliefs about an area of inquiry, moral or non-moral.74 
 I have also strategically integrated two empirical methods in conjunction with reflective 
equilibrium, establishing a narrative theory and carrying out a critical discourse analysis - 
methods in a process of documentary research, to be used as a device to establish explicit 
meaning and to uncover implicit affectation. Narrative analysis and discourse analysis are 
complementary to each other where narrative analysis establishes historicity and discourse 
analysis establishes how meaning is created and reproduced in that narrative where  “All 
discourse is in some or other way narrative”.75 Alan Bryman suggests that narrative analysis 
involves “/…/ a wide variety of approaches that are concerned with the search for and the 
analysis of the stories that people employ to understand…their world around them”.76 A 
performative narrative analysis places an emphasis on the way that words and phrases are used, 
including how the audience/reader responds to that narrative.77  Kaplan, referring to Ricoeur 
and his narrative theory suggest that “Anything that is recounted unfolds in time, and anything 
that occurs in time can be recounted”.78  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Rawls, John , Justice as Fairness – A Restatement (Third ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2011, 
p.31-32 
73 Rawls, A Theory of Justice,  p.43 
74 Daniels, Norman, "Reflective Equilibrium", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/reflective-
equilibrium/ p. 1 
75 Alvesson and Sköldberg, p.93 
76 Bryman, Alan, Social Research Methods, 2. ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p.412 
77 Ibid., p.412 
78 Kaplan, p.47 
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Reliability	  and	  Validity	  
Legislative history which includes the formulations of government bills, public state inquiries, 
government directives and reports serve as both remnants and narrating sources79 in my 
approach to develop understanding of the process of legal reform both before and after the 
implementation of a new law. By remnant I mean any (documentary) source that has not been 
exposed to “subjective distortion” and by narrating source I mean quite the opposite, a source 
that has or may have been exposed to a potential distorting medium. Remnants are considered 
more reliable as sources under critical analysis. Remnants are also understood as being the 
effect of an event ( e.g. new laws that result from legislative process) whereas narrating sources 
are perceived as expressing an event (case law and verdicts). In that the legislative documents  
analyzed throughout this thesis are official government and state publications, the question of 
authenticity is easily confirmed and as such as sources – they serve as both remnants and 
narrating sources that avoid distortion (post-publication). In this analysis the distortion of the 
narration happens after the publication of the legislative history of the laws – a distortion that is 
manifested in the judicial decision making process and actualized in the verdicts and thus 
through the process of case law, has the capacity to distort future judicial decisions. I will 
return to this point later when I address de Sousa Santos identification of law and legal 
processes as “distortions of reality”, but for the moment it serves to outline the narrative history 
and temporal dimension of the laws regulating sexual offences against children. 
 
Section	  One	  -­‐	  The	  Past	  “Now”	  But	  the	  Present	  “Then”	  -­‐	  A	  Narrative	  
Recourse	  and	  a	  Legal	  (Re)source.	  
 
Previously in the background of this thesis, I presented the legal case in question80, the 
reformed law (SFS 2005:90) and Penal Code text 81 relating to sexual offenses against children. 
I presented the judicial reasoning in the legal case, certain aspects of and citations from the 
legislation that specifically related to the legal pre-requisites for rape of a child as articulated in 
the legislation. I also presented the articulated text of the law. I finished that section with a 	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80 NJA 2006, s.510 
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citation from Prop. 2004/05:45 which clearly stated that a child under fifteen years of age can 
never give their consent to engage in sexual activity with an adult. Also an adult sexual 
offender cannot claim mutual consent from a child as a mitigating factor in his defence 82. In 
short, I established the plot of this narrative, where “/…/the basic unit of narrative is a 
plot/…/”.83  
In this section of the thesis I wish to build on the legal historical narrative presented in the 
Background by (re)constructing the narrative from the text of the legislative history of recent 
law reforms related to the subject matter of this thesis. I will do this by reflecting backwards to 
the legislation84 of the law reform in 199885 and then working forwards through the government 
bill86 that relates to the law reform of 200587 and was relevant at the time of the verdict reached 
in the Swedish Supreme Court in 200688. Finally the narrative will continue forwards to 2012 
and the legislation89 concerning the recently implemented law reform90 of 2013. As I am 
establishing the historical narrative I will also analyze the discourse of selected statements in 
the different relevant texts that make up this narrative. Although I have afforded a lot of time to 
different other documentation that make up the legislative history (Public State Inquiry and 
Commision Inquiry Report) it is only the Government Bills that are of interest to me here in 
this thesis. Zetterstöm suggests that in relation to the various documents involved in law, that it 
is government bills are of most interest when consulting the legislative history of a law.91 
Reaching out to Ricoeur and Others– Narrative Theory and Discourse Clearly 
In harmony with the narrative, I also carry out a critical discourse analysis on the legislative 
history texts to determine how the socio-political will of society is and was articulated 
explicitly in the varying texts of these official documents. Critical discourse analysis will 
further uncover if the text might also reveal implicit underlying themes. I specifically adopt 
Faircloughs perspective that meaning-making in a text is not only reliant on what is explicit -   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Br.B 6 kap.4-6§§ 
82 Prop 2004/05, p.156 (refers to Bilaga 1 in that government bill) 
83 Kaplan, p.50 
84 Prop. 1997/98:55 
85 SFS 1998:393 
86 Prop. 2004/05:45 
87 SFS 2005:90, see also Br.B 6kap.4-6§§. Also 6kap.14§ 
88 NJA 2006 s.510 
89 Prop. 2012/13:111 
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“what is said” but also on what is implicitly assumed - what Fairclough refers to as “unsaid” 
assumptions.92 Fairclough suggests that texts have the ability to invoke change as ‘elements of 
social events’93. The causal effects of texts as elements of social change are related to meaning-
making processes94 where three elements that may be analyzed separately are “/…/the 
production of the text, the text itself, and the reception of the text”.95 In that I am (re)producing 
a scaled down narrative based on previously produced texts, I will focus on and analyze 
specific words and phrases that I have identified as markers that demonstrate both explicit and 
implicit meanings concerning socio-political will and policy but also appear suggestive of an 
articulated “strategic stagnancy” that I have referred to earlier. Relating these selected words 
and phrases to de Sousa Santos notion of a “crisis of law in the paradigm of modernity”, I 
attempt to define if the words/phrases are indicators of excesses and deficits related to 
ambiguity, that he suggests are indicative of  - and reproductive in maintaining - this crisis. 
Whereas de Sousa Santos and others suggest that this is congruent with the paradigm of 
modernity, and in certain respects I agree, I would also argue that this “ambivalence and 
ambiguity” is strategic.  
Paul Ricoeur’s revised hermeneutical circle is based on the Aristotelian notion of mimesis. 
“The first stage represents the temporal, structural, and symbolic dimensions of human action 
that are “prefigured” by a narrative; the second stage represents the act of emplotment that 
“configures” and organizes events into a story (as discussed earlier); the third stage represents 
the act of reading or listening that “transfigures” experience by connecting the world of the 
narrative with the world of the reader.”96 Ricoeur also defines discourse as being the event of 
language, where he proposes: “/…/If all discourse is actualized as an event, all discourse is 
understood as meaning”.97 An event is a historical occurrence that takes place in time and finds 
its meaning only through narrative configurations of sentences where the historical explanation 
of the involvement of that event in history is a narrative explanation.98  
Revisiting The Plot – prefigured or configured?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Zetterström, p.90 
92 Fairclough, Norman, Analysing Discourse, Routledge, London, 2003 (e-book) p.52-53 
93 ibid, p.40 
94 ibid, p.48 
95 ibid, p.50 
96 Kaplan, p.55 
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The	  Past	  -­‐	  Prop.	  1997/98:55	  
The government bill entitled “Kvinnofrid” (Prop.1997/98:55) which translated to English is 
“Freedom for Women” (my transl.) is where the trajectory of the historical narrative begins. 
The dominant socio-political discourse that was behind implementing a law reform was “mens 
violence against women” where violence against children was also to be covered by the new 
law.99 Stina Jeffner (1997), referring to the then existing law text100 argued that “/…/The 
juridical definition in its current state adopts a gender neutral language”.101  Referring to the 
conclusion in the “Violence against Women Commission Report”,102 Jeffner points out that this 
gender neutral stance was questioned by the commission. They argued that the stance of formal 
(legal) gender neutrality would only hide the reality of such violence and as such, sanctioning 
such crimes would lose “/…/the pedagogical and preventative effect that should be sought 
after”.103 The text of the law should reflect reality was a conclusion of the Violence against 
Women Commission.104  
The government bill105 which succeeded the above mentioned commission report was current at 
the time of Jeffner’s thesis where the government reached this conclusion: 
“The Government Stance: Any specific rules are concerning rape of children shall not be implemented now”106 
The statement is explicitly clear that no specificity is accorded to rules regulating the rape of 
children, where it was also concluded that the same rules that apply to adults may also apply to 
children, but that the offence can be classified as rape of a child.107  What is interesting for this 
discourse analysis is the inclusion at the end of this statement of the word “now”. What does 
the inclusion of mean here?  From the context of Ricoeur’s notion of “cosmic time” which I 
have explained earlier and Fairclough’s discussion on “/…/textual elements which are germane 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Ricoeur, Paul, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning,  p.12 
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99 Prop.1997/98:55 p. 1 
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to the construction of time”108, the inclusion of this small word is central to this discourse 
analysis. The inclusion of the adverb “now” can mean “at the present time”, a reference to the 
present tense based on experience of the present and the past, but it can also mean “very soon” 
or “in the near future”, a forward-looking suggestive inclusion of expectation. In the context of 
the present, the statement is explicit in stating that no new law concerning children is to be 
implemented. However, in the context of the “ the near future”, there is both an explicit 
reference to the future but also an implicit assumption to the issue surrounding the regulation of 
sexual offences relating to the rape of children – the government does not see this issue as an 
immediate concern. To expand on this this I will refer to a similar statement from the 
government bill Prop.2004/05:45 where I suggest that the ‘now’ in 1998 through intertextuality 
relates to the then future of 2005. Norman Fairclough discusses how a relational approach to 
texts adopts an ‘internal’ and ‘external’ perspective. Internal relations refer to semantic, 
grammatical, lexical and phonological relations. An analysis of external relations deals with 
other elements of the relations with social action, practice and structures. It is such relations 
that are of interest here, especially the ‘intertextual relationship’ with other texts external to but 
related to the text analyzed. Fairclough suggests that intertextuality “/…/is the presence of 
actual elements of other texts within a text”.109  
In that same government bill (Prop.1997/98:55) when addressing the question of extending the 
scope of the pre-requisite “rape” regarding children it was argued by the government that: 
“It can certainly be stated that these reasons are not as strong concerning children, because sexual violations 
perpetrated against a child generally must be judged more strictly than offences against adults”110  
 
In this statement I have chosen to remark on the use of the words “certainly” and “generally” 
and the role they play in creating meaning in this statement. I would argue that the use of 
“certainly” establishes an authoritative tone in the text which sets the mood for the rest of the 
statement. In being placed before the inclusion of the word “generally”, this strategic 
combination of words asserts a common-sense legitimacy to the statement, and perhaps to 
subsequent text that follows.  This statement is immediately followed by a new paragraph 
which starts with this statement: 	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109 ibid.,  p.148 
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“The proposed changes recommended by the commission solve this problem as such. The change however, goes 
further. It involves that in principle all forms of sexual relations with someone under 15 years of age shall be 
judged as rape of children. It can be strongly questioned if such a far-reaching extension can be defended”.111  
The words and phrases that are of most interest in this statement are “solve” and “problem”, “as 
such”, “however” “strongly questioned” and “far-reaching extension”. Deployed in the context 
of the text they are actually used in, and in relation to the previous authoritative statement what 
is of most interest in the analysis of this statement, is the “meaning-making” potential the 
combination of words imply. I would argue that the first statement analyzed above establishes 
authority and a common sense meaning-making effect so that the subsequent paragraph which 
follows and deals explicitly with the government rejection of special rules that relate to 
children, allows the recommendations of the commission to be discursively undermined 
through the text. Moreover, it also establishes a social effect of common sense understanding 
accepting of the legitimacy of the government stance. The use of “as such” in relation to the 
proposed changes of the commission seems to demonstrate this, but the inclusion of “however” 
in the subsequent sentence prepares and establishes a potential for an undermining and/or 
oppositional effect. The use of “strongly questioned” and “far-reaching” serve to emphasize the 
governments authoritative stance in relation to the proposals of the commission. 
I would also argue that a statement that follows the above statements confirm this discursive 
strategic articulation of meaning-making: 
“The disadvantages with the Commission’s proposals are in the opinion of the government such that it is not 
expedient to build further on the proposals. Instead this question should also be taken up in the evaluation of 
sexual offences that the government will be appointing in the near future. This inquiry should be given the task to 
suggest a solution to the problem discussed above dealing with the application of the pre-requisite violence in 
actions that are directed against small children”112 
In this final statement from that government bill, the word “disadvantages” and the phrases 
“not expedient” and “to suggest a solution to the problem” are of interest to this analysis. The 
actual meaning of expedient - “/.../providing an easy and quick way to solve a problem or do 
something”113 is most interesting because it denies a sense of urgency and suggests that no 
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immediacy is required in dealing with the “problem” surrounding the sexual offence of rape 
involving children. The government can wait until an appointed commission can investigate 
sexual offences and solve the ambiguously unspecified problem. Referring to the discussion on 
meaning-making in texts, Fairclough argues that “/…/what is ‘said’ in a text is ‘said’ against a 
background of what is ‘unsaid’, but taken as given”.114 This is evident in this statement and is 
congruent with my earlier argument on meaning-making and the establishment in a text of a 
common sense effect. It is in relation to the authority confirmed in and by the government 
statements, that the background meaning-making is implicitly deployed that allows the 
authority or power expressed to be relayed  through the text and  portrayed as ‘given’ by the 
deployment of words in a certain order. Fairclough discusses how social practices articulate 
discourse115 and how meaning-making mediates the social effect of texts.  
The	  Present	  –	  Prop.	  2004/05:45	  
Following the recommendations of an appointed law commission in SOU 2001:14116, the then 
sitting Swedish government introduced a government bill (Prop. 2004/05:45) where it was 
stated that: 
“The Governments Proposal: A special penal rule concerning rape against children is to be implemented”.117 
This statement is similar to the earlier statement118 analyzed from Prop.1998/97 but differs in 
that this statement relates to the present and implies a sense of urgency to implement the law. I 
contend that this statement and the statement from 1998 are intertextually linked and that it is 
through establishing a narrative that the link between these two declarative texts is evident. 
Fairclough discusses how the textual movement between  the “not now” referred to 1998, as a 
statement has been transformed into a “now” in 2005.  
“With the purpose of further strengthening children and the protection for youth against exploitation  in a sexual 
related context and to emphasize the seriousness of sexual offences that are directed against children special legal 
rules are to be implemented concerning amongst other things rape of children and sexual abuse of children.”119 
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115 ibid. p.96 
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118 See footnote 102 
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In this statement, the phrase “further strengthening” is of interest in that it implicitly pre-
supposes that the previous law reform had succeeded in strengthening the protection of 
children, and seems to suggest that the old law was good enough but the new law is a necessary 
improvement, in keeping current with changing societal-phenomena.   
“To prevent and challenge these criminal offences effectively presupposes a well - developed penal legal 
prevention but also a well-functioning legal system with actors who have  understanding for and knowledge of 
questions relating to sexual offences”.120  
This statement refers both directly and indirectly to the courts and legal institutions and their 
legitimacy but also to societal expectations of a high standard of merit and education into the 
serious matters being adjudicated over. Fairclough relating to semantic relations in texts and 
quoting Weber (1964) describes how all systemic structures of authority attempt to establish 
and construct belief in its legitimacy121. Fairclough also suggests that orders of discourse may 
be perceived as social dominance (organization and control) over linguistic variation122 where 
social practices from Fairclough’s perspective, articulate discourses.  
“The motives behind the criminalization of sexual abuse have varied over time”.123 
“The views of and knowledge of sexual offences change and develop over time and it is therefore important that 
laws/legislation follow that change”.124  
 
The last two statements refer explicitly to time and knowledge, but also imply juridical 
discourse and are declarative in their tone. The statement seems to be both explicitly 
explanatory and implicitly forgiving and confirming all at once. What I mean by this is that the 
use of the words “motives” and “change” are suggestive of discourse and variability in relation 
to legality whereas the words “develop” and “varied” are in relation to the temporal dimensions 
of those discourses. Fairclough points out that “/…/Space, time and space-times are routinely 
constructed in texts”.125 
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The	  future	  –	  Prop.	  2012/13:111	  
In this government bill, the emphasis was to improve on the law reforms of 2005 following the 
commission report entitled “Sexual Offences Act – Evaluation and Reform Proposals” 
(Sv.“Sexualbrottslagstiftningen – utvärdering och reformförslag”).  
“In the government bill changes are proposed to the sexual offences laws which aim to further tighten the law and 
strengthen the protection for the sexual integrity and the right to sexual self-determination”.126 
The first statement analyzed here focusses again on the use of the word “further” but in a 
different context in relation to the previous government bill, where the use of “further tighten” 
suggests again that the previous bill had succeed in strengthening the law but this reform assists 
that law even more by being more stringent.  
“To further emphasize the seriousness of sexual offences that are directed against children it is recommended that 
the scope of application for gross sexual abuse against children is broadened. The purpose is to provide the 
judiciary with a broader scope to adjudicate over serious sexual abuse of children as gross offences”127 
Once again the word “further” provides a sense of previous success, but the entire statement 
and especially the phrase “The purpose is to provide the judiciary with a broader scope to 
adjudicate over serious sexual abuse of children as gross offences” is steeped in articulated 
meaning. It seems to explicitly suggest that the legislators have identified that the 
courts/judiciary are limited in their scope of application relating to previous law reforms, but 
that the primary interest is for the protection of children. I would suggest, that this statement 
also serves as an admission that the judiciary “is” a problem or has been a problem for previous 
law reforms to achieve their full effect, and that the legislators are implicitly associating this 
broadening as a “help” to the judiciary more than as a help to society. Is this an example of a 
triple edged emancipatory struggle – emancipation for the legislators in increasing the potential 
for the law by addressing a structural problem, emancipation for society and its children in 
extending the scope of the law, but emancipation for the judiciary in that they have more space 
to adjudicate over and perhaps interpret and apply the law. All actors are not exclusive to but 
integral in the structure that is society large, where from the perspective of Paul Ricoeur, 
juridical discourse occurs in all these spaces. 
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“It is therefore important to have an expedient and effective sexual offences legislation. The penal legal protection 
makes up however only a part of the work to combat these problems”.128 
In this last statement the use of the word “expedient” is very different than the previous 
encounter. Now, a sense of urgency is required and immediacy is achieved by the inclusion of 
that word. Also, this statement is implicitly suggesting that other factors might be in need of 
change where unspecified factors are articulated in the text but not specified in particular. 
“Documents are now viewed as media through which social power is expressed”129 where May, 
quoting Sparks (1992) suggests that documents may be perceived as attempts of persuasion if 
the context in which they were drafted is a considered perspective in an analytical approach. 
May, also referring to Agger (1991:7) suggest that an approach to documentation in this 
manner informs us of the type of society “/…/in which writers write and readers read”130  
Section	  2:	  The	  Spaces	  of	  Juridical	  Discourse	  –	  Gained	  in	  Application	  or	  
Lost	  in	  Interpretation	  within	  the	  Paradigm	  of	  Legal	  Modernity	  
 
 “One kind of unjust action is the failure of judges and others in authority to apply the 
appropriate rule or to interpret it correctly”.131  Law texts are often very general and concise 
and say little if anything about the purpose and intended scope of the actual legal rule and law 
in question. The legislative history and associated case law assist and support the courts and 
legal advisors as to how to interpret the meaning of the law and apply the relevant legal rule as 
was intended in and by the legislation.132 The legislators should include in the legislative 
history sufficient information concerning the purpose, scope and content of a legal rule.133  
If the text of a legal rule cannot provide a clear understanding of the legal problem in question, 
the legislative history should be consulted by the legal advisors and judiciary. The Government 
Bill is of most interest where all government bills contain a summary of the Law Commisions’ 	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report (SOU – State Public Inquiry), and commentaries relating to each specific bye-law. The 
legal officials can find explanations as to how the law is intended to be applied and ought to be 
interpreted. Also, the government bills may have more detailed explanations relating to the 
scope, content and purpose of the relevant law or bye-law, often offering precise explanations 
of the necessary prerequisites for the application of the law.134  
 
The Government Bill 2004/05:45135 as part of the legislative history referred to by the Swedish 
Supreme Court (the highest legal instance in that country) in the above mentioned case also 
stated that; 
“The point of departure for the law concerning children must be that they cannot consent to sexual acts./…/The 
government is therefore of the opinion that the law shall provide a special protection against sexual abuses for all 
children under 15 years of age, amongst other things the manner in which an offender of such abuses cannot in his 
defense claim consent from a child”136  
Reaching out for Social Emancipation by reaching in to Socio-Legal Theory  
 
“/…/it seems simple to apply the law to a case”137 
 Political language should not become pure rhetoric, with the intention of imposing implicit 
agendas that do not support reason or what are perceived as being for the common good.138 
The principles of democracy can come into conflict with each other in certain situations in that 
they relate to the future of basic ideals of the specific state in question and the interpretations of 
fundamental concepts of egality and liberty.139 John Rawls suggests that justice as fairness, as 
an alternative theory of justice, aims at presenting an (acceptable) moral and philosophical 
foundation for democratic institutions to broadly understand claims of equality and liberty. 
Rawls’ argues that by looking at the actual “public political culture of a democratic society” 
and the traditions of its laws and legal interpretation, that it is possible to conceptualize political 
justice based on such familiar ideas. 	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Paul Ricoeur discusses how in political liberal democratic societies, it is not permitted for any 
person to exact vengeance through violence as a means to achieving an immediate sense of 
justice. Rather, distance is required between what he refers to as “/…/the protagonists in the 
social game”140, between the action of initial suffering and the retribution that follows as a 
punishment and most importantly, a distance between vengeance and justice. “/…/the task 
ahead consists of analyzing, in concrete terms, our historical trajectories as subjects both at the 
biographical and the macrolevel”.141  
 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos discusses the paradigm of modernity as an ambitious and 
revolutionary project that is characterized by deficits and excesses.142  
In relation to law, de Sousa Santos describes how law has played a role in what he terms as the 
“reconstructive” management of deficits and excesses, integral in a paradigmatic crisis of 
modern law.143 Social emancipation and regulation may be thought of outside the limits of legal 
modern thinking, when understood through the lens of “oppositional postmodern theory of 
law”. This is a central theme for de Sousa Santos who suggests that his theory challenges the 
promises of modernity by allowing for two things. “Firstly, the perversities concern the 
fulfillment of some of the promises and the impossibility of fulfilling others. Secondly, it 
allows us to identify the emancipatory potential that the promises keep intact but that can only 
be fulfilled within postmodern social, cultural, political, epistemological, and theoretical 
boundaries”.144 In this thesis, it is by examining the emancipatory potential of the law reform(s) 
governing sexual offences against children that the discursive practices surrounding the law 
emerge when the juridical discourses are analyzed. De Sousa Santos discusses that some of the 
problems of modernity are such that no solution is possible to solve such issues, where the 
search for solutions is the basis of his “oppositional postmodernity” theory.145   
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De Sousa Santos’s conception of law is based on three core demands; reasonableness, practice 
and rhetoric.146 This thesis also focuses on the notion of reasonableness in relation to the 
practice of law and the interpretation of law.  It is not my intention to delve deeper into the 
challenges de Sousa Santos presents but rather, I refer to his question “Can Law be 
Emancipatory?”147 Discussing the plausibility of the question, de Sousa Santos suggests that 
the question applies specifically to the Western notion of law. De Sousa Santos argues that the 
question is built on assumptions, such as pre-supposing autonomous law as a social entity and 
also a general notion of social emancipation that is differentiated from individual or particular 
emancipatory agendas by different groups in different socio-historical backgrounds. It is also 
suggested that such a question involves a common sense idea that “/…/there are social 
expectations above and beyond current social experiences”148 where a growing gap that exists 
between experiences and expectations must be reduced.   
 
 
Back	  to	  the	  future?	  “2013	  –	  An	  Abstract	  “Space”	  Odyssey?”	  Summary	  
and	  Conclusions	  	  
“Order is not a pressure imposed upon society from without, but an equilibrium which is set up from within” 149 
It is important for me at this stage of this thesis to reiterate three important and summarizing 
perspectives relating to my approach. Firstly it was of lesser interest to me for the purpose of 
this thesis to critically assess the juridical details of why and how the courts reached this 
decision in the legal case studied here.  Further, I did not wish to include popular opinion and 
reactions to this and similar cases.150 It suffices here to identify that the Swedish courts did 	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actually reach such decisions by applying a then newly reformed law. Secondly, it is the 
juridical discourse of that legislation before and after the verdict151 that has been of interest 
here in that from a socio-legal perspective, I would argue that the socio-political intentions and 
expectations of that law were explicitly evident in the legislative history and the legal narrative 
I established in Section 1. Further I contend that these societal expectations serve as an 
indicator of the then socio-political will to implement change for what was deemed the greater 
good of society then. The verdict reached in the legal case, also serves in this thesis, as an 
indicator of a greater problem in a larger narrative, that is to say, the crisis of law related to the 
legal modern paradigm as suggested by De Sousa Santos, a paradigm of modern legal thinking 
and discourse that the Swedish legal system exists within.  
Questions and Answers, Problems and Solutions, Excesses and Deficits – 
Conclusions as part of the Whole and Exclusions That Make up the Whole 	  
The legislative history may be understood can be as representing the emancipatory expectations 
of Swedish society in 2005 aspiring to improve the then existing law from 1998152, where 
following a critical discourse analysis, I have demonstrated that underlying the text of the 
relevant legislation153, that a sense of urgency concerning sexual offences against children 
seemed evident, and more so than was apparent in the legislation relating to the law reforms of 
1998154. Freeman suggests that “The key to unlocking child abuse lies in the way societies have 
regarded children/…/we must acknowledge their entitlement to ‘equal concern and equal 
respect”.155 The government bill that implemented the law reforms in 1998 had excluded 
introducing specific regulation for according children special status regarding sexual offences 
involving rape. The regulation for the protection of adults against rape was deemed adequate 
and equally applicable for rape cases involving children.156 Regulation “/…/guarantees order in 
a society as it exists in a given moment/…/”.157 The discourse analysis of the text relating to 
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government stance158 concerning the status of children in relation to sexual offences regarding 
rape was revealed as being not expedient to the then “now” in 1998. 
Between 1998 and 2005 the social dynamic of Swedish society changed (as did the dynamic of 
the global society) with the technological developments of the internet and the “ascending 
vibrations” of the information age. The internet presented the legal system with new social 
phenomena where the internet was identified as a new space where the dangers of sexual abuse 
of children was rapidly developing.  “Besides all the creative and positive uses of the Internet, 
information technology has also been used to /…/exploit children sexually”.159  Olsson 
suggests that the internet provides space to otherwise marginalized groups in public, where the 
internet allows them to reach a greater public where they can even organize their own 
enterprises.160 Whereas Olsson refers to marginalized groups, I would apply the same argument 
to opportunistic sexual offenders, where the internet has allowed them to reach a wider group 
of children, without having to go “public”.  
The introduction of the law reform in 2005161 was also directly related to the developments in 
information technology. The law reform was in some respects emancipatory, for society 
including the legal system where de Sousa Santos argues that“/…/emancipation is the 
aspiration for a good order in a good society in the future”.162  Referring to the failing promises 
of modernity and law, de Sousa Santos suggests that concerning the limits of law to exact 
social change “/…/ a discrepancy has been growing between the scale of interests in social 
transformation and the organization of capacities to struggle for them”. 163 De Sousa Santos 
suggest that as this discrepancy occurs, different phenomena take place. Firstly, the limits of 
social change exacted through law become more clear whereas secondly, other forms of 
emancipatory action will “/…/gain or regain social credibility”.164 
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Boaventura de Sousa Santos suggests that the paradigm of modernity is characterized by a 
capacity for variability and contradictions based on social experiences and societal expectations 
which are becoming increasingly incongruent. This is a characteristic condition of modernity 
where the potentiality for societal instability stands on two pillars of the paradigm of modernity 
– regulation and emancipation. Modern regulation is made up of the group of institutions, 
norms and practices that attempt to ensure stability of expectations. Modern emancipation 
oppositionally challenges modern regulation by aspiring to increase the discrepancy between 
expectation and experience. The tension between emancipation and regulation is unstable and 
cannot be fully reconciled because the expectations of new regulation (emancipation 
transformed into a new type of regulation) will invoke emancipatory struggles that seek to 
oppose “order” as an expectation balanced with current experiences to achieve “good order” as 
an expectation for the future.165 Put simply, when good order in society has been achieved 
through emancipatory efforts, this in turn gives rise to new regulation that seeks to guarantee 
that order. In that emancipation is an oppositional process to regulatory expectations, a new set 
of challenges develops to destabilize the expectations guaranteed through regulation to replace 
order in the here and now with good order for the future. Law has both a regulatory and 
emancipatory potential and the trajectory of that potential ‘evolves’ with /…/the political 
mobilization of competing social forces”166 
Paul Ricoeur discusses the notion of “application” in relation to law. Firstly Ricoeur, discusses 
the transfer of conflicts to the plane of language and discourse as the primary function of the 
trial process. The entirety of the trial lies “/…/on the presumption of the validity of the norms 
applied in a given situation”167 where Ricoeur suggests that it is merely a question of 
application of the appropriate norm to the case in question. This process involves a complex 
system of argumentation and interpretation where the argumentation is supposed to stem from 
the validity of the rule applied to the specific case. Ricoeur argues that this validity is more than 
just a mechanical procedure, but implies two complimentary processes of interpretation; “/…/a 
choice has to be made among the available laws and more precisely between the prior 
interpretations of those laws accumulated over the long history of jurisprudence. This choice is 
governed by a presumption of affinity, let us say of “fit”, between the laws selected and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Santos, p. 2-3 
166 ibid., p. 85 167	  Ricœur, Reflections on the Just, p.227	  
	  	  	   	  
39	  
 
39 
case under consideration”.168 Moreover, Ricoeur points out that the case itself must be 
described so that it meets the requirement of the norm given in the legal case, which Ricoeur 
suggests constitutes a narrative interpretation of the legal case in question. For a judicial 
decision to be reached involves a combination of legal and narrative interpretations according 
to Ricoeurs ethical approach to this subject.  
Ricoeur argues that it may seem simple in applying a law to a case169 but he also points out that 
“/../we must not lose sight of the legal obligation that weighs on the judge, to render a 
judgement”170.)	  
This thesis suggests that the courts have interpreted and applied the law171 in a manner that 
seemed contrary to the purpose of the law reform and undermining to the expectations of the 
legislation. It could be argued that in allowing “consent” from a child who has engaged in 
sexual activity with an adult as an admissible factor during the prosecution of that adult as a 
sexual offender, it seemed as if the courts were allowing a child victim to share the 
responsibility for the calculated actions of an adult. (This man had simultaneously been charged 
with the rape of three other young girls under the age of fifteen, the youngest of these, a twelve 
year old, had not even reached her teens.) Anderson and Doherty discuss judicial rape, where 
citing Lees (1993, 1997), they argue that in rape cases, it is often the victim who is on trial, not 
the offender, where ‘judicial rape’ is described as a “/…/a spectacle of degradation visited upon 
the victim rather than the offender”.172 Also citing Williams (1984:67) Anderson and Doherty 
compare how victim responsibility is rarely questioned in crimes such as robbery, but in rape 
cases the responsibility of the victim is most often called into question.173 “Definitions of what 
counts as ‘rape’ and who is to be treated as a ’genuine’ victim – innocent rather than 
accountable – are constructed in discourse and practices that reflect the social, political and 
cultural conditions of a society”.174 I would further argue that although adherence to the rule of 
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law is the backbone of every democracy, it is not without its limitations when justice for an 
individual is transferred to the juridical discourse of formal (positive) law. 
De Sousa Santos argues that “ the specific scale used in the representation of reality accounts 
for the type of phenomena that can or cannot be adequately regulated by law. There are 
phenomena that, no matter how important in social terms, cannot be adequately dealt withby 
law because they fall outside the regulation threshold defined by the scale at which that 
particular law operates”175 I agree with de Sousa Santos that the excess/deficits within the 
paradigm of legal modernity are related to ambiguity and legal modernity as a failed project, 
but on the basis of the analysis I have provided in this thesis, I suggest that these ambiguities 
are not ambiguous to those who adjudicate in the “approved” space of juridical discourse. 
Within space they are anything but ambiguous but instead maintain strategically stagnant 
dynamics – ensure legitimacy and equilibrium, not for the rule in question, but for the rule of 
law.   
Legislation strives after emancipatory change and is regulatory, a condition in the paradigm of 
modernity which can be understood as being a discrepancy between social expectations and 
social experiences, a tension that is irreconcilable. Therefore the rule of law and the courts (are 
by the structure they represent and the institutions they are part of incapable of realizing 
emancipation because their backward looking perspective is contrary to the forward trajectory 
of social emancipation – as Hydén has many times pointed out – system interest are always at 
the centre of the courts and judges because they are instituted to be so---they are the mouth 
pieces of justice and as such they are the rule of law. Legal justice may be the property of the 
courts but social justice, whether achieved or not in the formal legal system, is the property of 
society.  	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